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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND
ARTICULATION THEORIES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS*
Vincy Fon**
Francesco Parisi***
I. INTRODUCTION
While there are those who know much about the creation of
societal norms of behavior, there is much that is unknown.
Significant work remains to obtain a full understanding of how
such behavioral regularities emerge. This article contributes to the
field of custom formation by modeling the process of customary
law formation under different legal doctrines and regimes. Such
modeling is particularly important considering the fact that legal
scholars have recently criticized the traditional explanations of
customary law as being tautological, non-descriptive of actual
practice, and unable to provide meaningful normative guidance in
the adjudication of customary rules. Most recently, Goldsmith and
Posner (1999, 2000) have critiqued traditional customary law
theories and suggested that customary rules emerge out of a
coincidence of interest rather than a sense of legal obligation.1
This article begins by considering the extent to which the
coincidence of the states’ normative interest is sufficient to yield
efficient rules of customary law. In modeling the formation of
customary rules, the authors pay close attention to the timing of a

* This article builds upon research in the George Mason University Working
Paper Series by the same authors (Fon and Parisi 2002).
** Associate Professor, George Washington University, Department of
Economics. E-mail: yfon@gwu.edu.
*** Professor of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program, George Mason
University, School of Law and Distinguished Professor of Law and Economics,
University of Milan. E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu. The authors would like to thank
Anthony D’Amato, Robert Cooter, and the participants to the 13th Annual Conference
of the American Law & Economics Association, and the Workshops in Law and
Economics at the New York University, Economics Department, University of
California at Berkeley, School of Law, University of Amsterdam, Economics
Department, and University of Hamburg Graduate College, for valuable comments on
an earlier draft.
1
Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2000) question theories of international law that
base custom on some sense of exogenous obligation by the states.
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state’s articulation of its beliefs and the timing of its action. This
article builds upon the findings of D’Amato (1971, forthcoming)
and Parisi (1998), extending the analysis to consider new theories
of customary law formation, with special emphasis on the role of
articulation.2
Under traditional customary international law theory, a tenet of
international law becomes a viable norm only when (1) the tenet is
widespread in practice and (2) it is rational for each individual
member of the relevant international community to follow the tenet
at each point in time. In contrast to this traditional theory, this
article offers an extension of existing articulation theory that allows
states’ articulations to anticipate the element of practice, thus
letting international state actors signal how they might wish the
norm to develop before any specific incidence of conflict occurs.
States fulfill the articulation component by making
“announcements” of their intentions: announcements that they may
make through formal unilateral statements as well as through
bilateral or multilateral informal understandings.
This article shows that while customary norms are often
capable of supporting cooperative behavior by participating states,
outcomes resulting from reliance on traditional customary norms
may systematically fall short of what might be obtainable through
articulated norms. The key reason for this shortcoming is that
customary norms necessarily require a “first mover” to begin the
custom; however, such custom-initiating actions will only take
place in a context where the action is necessary. In such settings,
state actors’ preferences (and resulting actions) are inherently
biased by the immediacy of the situation, and thus any custom that
begins is unlikely the best outcome.
In contrast, an articulation norm can commence in the
abstract—outside the context of an imminent emergency. The
2
According to these theories, in the process of ascertaining the existence and
content of customary rules, the states’ statements and expressions of belief are
relevant. D’Amato (1971, forthcoming) considers articulation as a formative element
of international customary law. In D’Amato, this element operates in conjunction with
state practice and abstention. This article utilizes D’Amato’s concept of articulation,
but pushes this notion beyond its originally intended scope. The model of articulation
processes that this article develops allows states to express their consensus over
potential rules prior or concurrent to the time of their action through practice. When
articulation occurs before any customary practice, articulation can replace actual
action and by itself generate a rule of customary law. In both cases, custom emerges
when states undertake an action that is consistent with their expression of normative
views contained in their prior or concurrent articulations.
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acting states are thus separated from the type of role-specific
context that often clouds and biases customary norm formation.
Consequently, articulated norms are much more likely to produce
outcomes that are closer to ideal. Moreover, norms resulting from
articulation are more likely to satisfy states’ participation
constraints at any given time than are customary norms. The
economic model explained below corroborates these results and
suggests that a norm’s strength depends on environmental
parameters with predictable effects. These parameters include
discount rates, the costs of custom compliance relative to the
benefits obtained when other states comply with the custom, the
number of participants, time delays, and uncertainty. Since
customary norms tend to depend more crucially on these
parameters, they are much harder to support than articulated norms.
The structure of this article is as follows. Part II will present the
traditional doctrines of customary law, which provide the legal
framework for customary law formation. Part III will model the
traditional custom-formation process for the case of bilateral
custom and will extend the bilateral custom model to multilateral
custom cases. This Part will focus specifically on situations
involving uncertainty and delay in the formation and recognition of
an emerging custom and how such situations affect states’
participation and effort incentives. Participation and effort
incentives are instrumental in identifying the limits of the
traditional customary processes in real-life conditions. Part IV will
revisit these limits by examining the potential role of alternative
doctrines and processes of customary law formation in mitigating
the shortcomings of traditional customary law theory. This Part will
introduce a variation in the custom-formation process by which
states express consensus over emerging rules of custom before
actually establishing customary practice through action. Part IV
will also model the custom formation process under these
alternative doctrines and will identify the respective limits and
advantages of the alternative frameworks of custom formation in
different environmental settings.
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II. THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW3
Relatively few principles govern the formation of customary
law. The theory of customary law defines custom as a practice that
emerges outside of legal constraints, which individuals and
organizations spontaneously follow in the course of their
interactions out of a sense of legal obligation.4 Over time, two or
more individual actors embrace norms that they view as requisite to
their collective welfare. According to traditional theories, an
enforceable custom emerges from two formative elements: (a) a
quantitative element consisting of a general or emerging practice;
and (b) a qualitative element reflected in the belief that the norm
generates a desired social outcome.
A. The Quantitative Element
The quantitative requirement for customary law formation
concerns both the length of time and the universality of the
emerging practice. With respect to the time requirement, there is no
universal minimum time duration required for the emergence of
customary rules. Customary rules have evolved from both
immemorial practice and single acts (Tunkin 1961). Nevertheless,
French jurisprudence traditionally requires the passage of forty
years for the emergence of an international custom. Similarly,
German doctrine usually requires thirty years for an international
custom to form (D’Amato, 1971, 57). Naturally, the longer the
formative stage of a custom, the less likely it is that the custom
effectively provides a viable substitute for formal law or treaty
agreements or adapts to changing circumstances over time.
International legal theory is ambivalent regarding the condition
of universality. Charney (1986) suggests that the system of
international relations is analogous to a world of individuals in the
state of nature thereby dismissing the idea that unanimous consent
by all participants is required before binding customary law is
formed. Well-accepted restatements of international law require
consistency and generality—not universality—for custom

3

Part II builds upon research presented at the American Political Science
Convention by Francesco Parisi (2000).
4
For example, see Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§ 102(1).
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formation (D’Amato 1971; Brownlie 1990). Recent international
law cases restate the universality requirement in terms of a norm
experiencing increasing and widespread acceptance. Notably, these
cases allow special consideration for emerging general norms and
local clusters of spontaneous default rules that should become
widespread over time. However, where fluctuations in behavior
render it impossible to identify a general practice, the consistency
requirement is not met.
Furthermore, with regard to rules at the national or local level,
the varying pace at which social norms transform suggests that
there is no way to establish a general time or consistency
requirement as an across-the-board condition for the validity of a
custom. The stochastic origin of social norms anticipates some
variance in individual observations of practice. A flexible time
requirement is particularly necessary in situations of rapid flux
where exogenous changes are likely to affect the incentive structure
of the underlying relationship.
The findings of this article shed light on the appropriate design
of customary processes and provide guidance in adjudicating
customary rules with respect to both issues of timing and
consistency of application.
B. The Qualitative Element
The phrase opinio iuris ac necessitatis, which describes a
widespread belief in the desirability of a practice and the general
conviction that the practice represents an essential norm of social
conduct, generally identifies the second formative element of a
customary rule. This element often finds definition in terms of
necessary and obligatory convention (Kelsen 1939, 1945; D’Amato
1971; Walden 1977).
The traditional formulation of opinio iuris ac necessitatis is
problematic because of its circularity—it is quite difficult to
conceptualize that law can be born from a practice that most
already believe to be required by law. The traditional requirement
that participant states must believe in the normative principle
embedded in the emerging practice (opinio iuris) may have arisen
in response to game inefficiencies as a belief of social obligation to
support behavioral rules that avoid aggregate losses from strategic
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behavior.5 This article considers Goldsmith and Posner’s (1999 and
2000) critique of opinio iuris, according to which rules of
customary law emerge out of a coincidence of interest rather than a
sense of legal obligation. It builds on Goldsmith and Posner’s
insightful critique in an attempt to verify the extent to which
coincidence of states’ normative interest may be sufficient to yield
efficient rules of customary law.
III. A MODEL OF CUSTOMARY LAW FORMATION
Customary rules emerge from past practice. Prior to the
consolidation of a practice into a binding custom, states engage in
actions on a purely voluntary basis.6 Two main factors influence an
individual actor’s choice to engage in a given action: (a) the
immediate costs and benefits of the action (i.e., circumstantial
interest); and (b) the interest that the actor may have for the future
in establishing a binding customary rule (i.e., normative interest).
The distinguishing characteristic between an emerging custom and
a mere usage is that emerging customs include the belief that the
current practice may lead to a binding customary rule. Such
normative expectations contribute to and influence states’ actions.
The relative importance of circumstantial and normative
interests in influencing states’ actions varies with specific
situations. In some cases, circumstantial interest is of decisive
importance—for example, states may engage in a specific action to
satisfy their immediate interests, regardless of their expectations
that the action may generate a binding rule for the future. In other
cases, normative interest dominates, as when states engage in a
certain activity in order to establish a binding custom that will
govern future interactions.7
5

The practical significance of this requirement is that it narrows the range of
enforceable customs—only those practices recognized as socially desirable or
necessary would eventually ripen into enforceable customary law. Once there is a
consensus that group members ought to conform to a given rule of conduct, a legal
custom can emerge when some level of spontaneous compliance with the rule is
manifest. As a result, observable equilibriums that are regarded by society as either
undesirable (e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma or an uncooperative outcome) or unnecessary
(e.g., a common practice of greeting neighbors cordially) will lack the qualitative
element of legal obligation, and therefore will not generate enforceable legal rules.
6
Notably, customs are not all formed voluntarily; Goldsmith and Posner (2000)
discuss the use of coercion by a powerful state to impose rules of international law.
7
The authors make no claims with respect to the long-term stability of the rule
that emerges. In fact, the analysis is perfectly consistent with that of Goldsmith and
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While in some situations the motives behind states’ action may
converge, in other cases, possible tension exists between states’
circumstantial and normative interests.8 In the presence of such a
conflict, the customary law formation process poses a cooperation
problem. This article investigates the process of customary law
formation in situations resulting from conflict between states’
circumstantial and normative interests. In order to effectuate this
analysis, this article makes certain assumptions, including the
assumption that at each moment in time the circumstantial interest
of one state is in conflict with the commonly shared normative
interests of the other states. More specifically, this article considers
the case of customary practices that create costs for one state while
generating benefits for others, such that the total benefits exceed
the total costs incurred by the participant states and the customary
practice is therefore socially desirable. The social net payoff is the
sum of costs and benefits for all states. Well-accepted economic
analysis demonstrates that states determine the socially optimal
effort level by equating social marginal cost and marginal benefit.9
The following section of this article considers the extent to which
customary law processes are capable of approaching a social
optimum. Initially, this article’s analysis addresses bilateral
practices and subsequently extends the analysis to multilateral
practices.
In practice, states are often faced with voluntary participation
problems in the absence of existing customs. Such problems occur,
in part, because voluntary participation in a new practice can
impose costs on one state while conferring benefits on another. The
following hypothetical situation illustrates this problem. Two states
exist; the first state faces an emergency and the second state faces
Posner (1999, 2000), who argue that the behavioral regularity will disappear if the
normative interests of the nations change. This article, however, allows for the rule to
have some short-term binding effects that constrain states from departing from
accepted rules in pursuit of their circumstantial short-term interests.
8
In some instances, following a given practice would satisfy both the
circumstantial and the normative interests of the states. In other words, participation
may be Pareto superior at each time period and all states would benefit from
compliance with the custom during each time period. In these instances, following the
emerging custom would always be a dominant strategy for all states. Consequently,
such practices would become self-enforcing since no state would ever face a
temptation to depart from them. Thus, the recognition and enforcement of such
practices as rules of customary law would be unnecessary. These practices fall outside
the scope of the present analysis since they would not pose strategic compliance
problems.
9
Appendix A1.1 demonstrates this principle.
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the decision of whether to voluntarily rescue the first. Assuming
that the marginal cost of the rescue activity is lower than the
benefit, the cost-benefit analysis would render the rescue socially
desirable. However, in the initial time period, if the second state
were to undertake a rescue, it would bear a cost while the first state
would receive a benefit. These immediate costs and benefits are the
states’ circumstantial interests.
Notably, the circumstantial interests of the two states have
different signs. The rescuer’s circumstantial interest is negative
(i.e., the rescuing state expects to face a cost), while the rescued
state’s circumstantial interest is positive (i.e., the rescued state
expects a benefit from being rescued). In this example, the choice
of action (whether the rescue will occur) is in the hands of the
rescuer, while the rescued state is a passive recipient of the benefit.
Thus, when evaluating whether to undertake a rescue activity, it is
sufficient to consider only the participation and incentives of the
rescuer—the state that faces negative circumstantial interests.10
The analysis continues by assuming that the states will engage
in repeat interactions. After the initial time period, the states’
alternate and future roles (as rescuers or rescued) will be decided
solely on a probabilistic basis. In each subsequent period, there is a
probability that a given state will be the beneficiary of other state’s
activities (the probability of being rescued). On the other hand,
there is also a probability that the state will continue to be on the
giving side (the probability of again being the rescuer).
One possible outcome of the above-mentioned hypothetical is
that the states follow socially desirable practices, subject to
reciprocity. Here, reciprocity extends both to the participation in
the emerging practice and to the quality or effort level of the
reciprocating conduct. This outcome provides clarity in identifying
the extent to which the acting state’s normative interest may lead to
action and customary practice; it assumes that the state can expect
reciprocity at whatever effort level chosen by that state when it in
turn needs rescuing.11 These premises facilitate analysis regarding
the extent to which the acting state’s circumstantial and normative

10

In the more general case of customary practice, this analysis implies assuming
away situations in which the initiators of the customary practice can create a benefit
for themselves, regardless of the other states’ participation and reciprocal compliance.
11
For a more general model of reciprocity in cooperation problems, see Fon and
Parisi (2003).

208

S PRING 2006

Customary Law and Articulation Theories

interests may lead to action and participation in the emerging
customary practice.
In the above-mentioned example, a state would need to have its
participation constraint satisfied for it to be willing to participate in
the rescue venture.12 For example, in the case of multilateral custom
formation, not every individual state becomes actively involved or
passively involved in the custom-generating practice. At any given
time, a positive number of non-participants observe other states’
activities without participating. These non-participating states may
seem like acquiescing spectators of an emerging custom.
A. Increasing the Number of Potential Participants to
Custom Formation
When the number of potential participants increases, the
probability of a state’s involvement decreases. The decrease in the
probability of involvement leads to a decrease in the optimal effort
level expended by the state. Likewise, as more participants become
involved, it becomes harder to satisfy the participation constraint,
making it less likely that individual states will take part in the
formation of a customary practice. Both results have relation to the
fact that the choice of initial participation imposes a present and
sure cost on participating states, while the probability of future
benefit-producing involvement with the emerging custom may
decrease with the number of participants.
These results are consistent with the empirical findings of
sociologists and anthropologists who have found that close-knit
environments with small communities of participants provide the
most fertile environments for the emergence of efficient customs
(Ulmann-Margalit 1977; Parisi 1998; Ellickson 2001). Moreover,
these results support Goldsmith and Posner’s (1999, 2000)
skepticism about invoking reciprocity to explain international
cooperation in cases involving more than two states. Finally, these
results have important implications for the adjudication of
customary norms. For example, some could argue that courts
should give great attention and enforcement to customs established
in small or close-knit communities given the efficiency with which
customary rules emerge in such environments. Likewise, local,
regional, and special customs should enjoy at least as much
12
Appendix A1.2 shows the formulation of the optimization problem faced by
the initial rescuer.
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recognition, if not more, than general and widespread customary
practices.
B. Introducing Uncertainty in the Formation of Custom
Thus far, the custom formation model has assumed that later
participants to the custom always follow the initial practice with
reciprocal behavior. This assumption has allowed the effects of
strategic participation and effort choices of the states to be isolated
from the effects of uncertainty regarding the future participation
and compliance of other states. In real-life settings, however, initial
participants to a customary practice have no guarantee that their
action will actually lead to the formation of a binding custom.
Thus, a state’s initial effort may not always meet with reciprocity,
which may undermine the motivation of the initial action and
frustrate the expectation of reciprocal behavior from others.
Returning to the hypothetical rescue example, if the potential
rescuer state has no assurance that its effort will meet with like
behavior when fortunes reverse, this lack of assurance may
compromise its incentives to offer voluntary rescue.
This section considers the conditions under which optimal
practices emerge when the initial participant states have no
assurance that others will reciprocate their practices. This analysis
requires an extension of the previous model to include the
possibility of uncertainty in custom formation. This model assumes
a probability that other states will follow the practice originally
undertaken by the state in question.13 For example, in the case of
multilateral custom formation, not every individual state engages
actively or passively in the custom-generating practice. At any
given time, a positive number of non-participants observe other
states’ activities without participating. These non-participating
states can be seen as acquiescing spectators of an emerging custom.
C. Introducing Time Lags in the Formation and
Recognition of Custom
Finally, the analysis of traditional custom formation processes
extends to consider the effects of time lags on the process of
emergence and recognition of custom. Time lags and delays in the
consolidation or recognition of a custom affect the time in which
13
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the initial participants are able to capture the benefit of the custom
they initiated. Delays can occur for numerous reasons. For
example, customs involving events of rare occurrence (e.g., a
rescue in outer space or on the high seas) may result in custom
formation delays. Similarly, delays can occur because of legal
system norms; some legal systems require a long-standing practice
of twenty or thirty years before the usage is recognized and
enforced as a binding customary rule.
The longer the delay in the formation process or recognition of
the custom, the lower will be the effort level rationally exerted by
the initial participants. As shown in A1.3.2 in the Appendix, the
presence of delays and time lags in the formation of the custom also
affects the participation constraint. This implies that some practices
that would have successfully evolved in the absence of delays and
lags might fail to develop if delays or lags occur.
In sum, when states have a positive time preference and
unaligned circumstantial and normative interests, delays in the
formation and recognition customs may produce negative
participation and incentive effects. The above-mentioned results
further suggest that custom-related settings that entail infrequent
state actions should require a lower number of observations, and
thus a shorter waiting period, before the practice may consolidate
as a binding rule. Otherwise, given the infrequency of action and
delay in custom formation, states would heavily discount the
benefits of future applications of the custom, and, as a result, would
have less incentive to participate in custom development.
IV. BELIEF AND ACTION IN CUSTOM FORMATION: THE RELEVANCE
OF TIMING AND ARTICULATION
Part III demonstrated that in situations where the circumstantial
and normative interests of the states do not align, the following
factors may have negative effects on the states’ participation and
incentives: (a) increases in the number of participants; (b)
uncertainty in the future development of the custom; and (c) delays
in the formation and recognition of the custom. These findings have
important implications for the assessment of alternative
mechanisms of customary law formation. This Part uses these
findings to investigate whether the adoption of alternative doctrines
of customary law formation can mitigate the shortcomings of
traditional customary law processes.
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This Part proceeds by considering an important variation in the
custom formation process called articulation theory. This
theoretical variant of traditional customary law processes allows
states to express their consensus over potential rules prior to
establishing custom through practice. Accordingly, custom emerges
when states undertake action consistent with the expression of a
belief contained in their prior or concurrent articulations.14 This
Part models the custom-formation process under such alternative
doctrines and identifies the respective limits and advantages of
these alternatives in different environments.
A. Normative Interests and Circumstantial Interests in the
Formation of Custom: The Role of Articulation
Notable scholars have considered the conditions under which
principles of justice can emerge spontaneously through the
voluntary interaction and exchange of individual group members.
As in a contractarian setting, the reality of customary law formation
relies on a voluntary process through which community members
voluntarily adhere to emerging behavioral standards and thus
develop rules that govern their social interactions.15 As discussed
above, this custom-formation process becomes problematic when
the states have unaligned circumstantial and normative interests.
Although some notable legal theorists and practitioners have
considered the requirement of opinio iuris in addressing customary

14
D’Amato (1971) allows for the alternative sequence of articulation occurring
prior to or concurrently with the state act (practice). In D’Amato, however, not much
emphasis is placed on the timing of practice and articulation for the understandable
reason that international law treats the two elements as qualitatively different from
each other (one is a physical act, the other is a human characterization). This treatment
of practice and articulation renders any discussion of the temporal order between the
two items mostly irrelevant under positive international law.
15
In this setting, Harsanyi (1955) suggests that optimal social norms are those
that would emerge through the interaction of individual actors in a social setting with
impersonal preferences. The impersonality requirement for individual preferences is
satisfied if the decision makers have an equal chance of finding themselves in any one
of the initial social positions and they rationally choose a set of rules to maximize their
expected welfare. Rawls (1971) employs Harsanyi’s model of stochastic ignorance in
his theory of justice. However, the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” introduces an element
of risk aversion in the choice between alternative states of the world, thus altering the
outcome achievable under Harsanyi’s original model with a bias toward equal
distribution (i.e., with results that approximate the Nash criterion of social welfare).
See Sen (1979); Ullmann-Margalit (1977); and Gauthier (1986) for further analysis of
the spontaneous formation of norms and principles of morality.
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law formation, many others have looked past the notion of opinio
iuris and, instead, have concentrated on the elements of
“articulation.”16 Articulation theories capture the following two
important features of customary law: (a) customary law is voluntary
in nature; and (b) customary law is dynamic. According to these
theories, in the process of ascertaining the qualitative element of
opinio iuris, the theorists and practitioners should attentively
consider states’ statements and expressions of belief. Individuals
and states articulate desirable norms in order to signal that they
intend to follow and to be bound by such norms. Thus, articulation
theories remove the guessing process from the identification of
opinio iuris and allow the manifestation of expressions of belief
before or in conjunction with customary action.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical scenario in which
articulation determines the content of emerging customary norms.
In this context, articulation may be a way for states to pre-commit
to the content and interpretation of an emerging international
custom. Subsequent consolidation and custom enforcement would
remain contingent upon the development of states’ future practices,
but articulation would facilitate the coordination between states
with respect to the emerging practice. Further, articulation can
represent a way for states to recognize an emerging norm of
international law even in the absence of concurrent state practice.17

16

In attempting to solve one of the problems associated with the notion of opinio
iuris, namely the troublesome problem of circularity, legal scholars, most notably
D’Amato (1971), have considered the crucial issue of timing of belief and action in the
formation of customary rules. The traditional approach emphasizes the awkward
notion that individuals must believe that a practice is already law before it can become
law. This approach basically requires the existence of a mistake for the emergence of a
custom: the belief that the law required an undertaken practice, when instead, it did
not. Obviously, this approach has its flaws. Placing such reliance on systematic
mistakes, the theory fails to explain how customary rules can emerge and evolve over
time in cases where individuals have full knowledge of the state of the law.
17
This formulation of the notion of articulation obviously encompasses different
possible factual scenarios, not all of which would find a readily applicable treatment
under positive international law. Under current law, the element of articulation is not
sufficient in itself to constitute custom. If separated from practice, articulation
processes would render custom formation similar to an informal legislative process,
given the possibility for generating new rules of international law via the meeting of
minds of state actors. This informal legislative process would be difficult to implement
in a multilateral setting since it would potentially impose excessive costs on third party
states in the monitoring and objection to states’ articulations. But see Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Nevertheless, this
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Consistent with the predicament of the economic models,
articulation theories suggest that states should give greater weight
to beliefs expressed before the emergence of a conflict.18 When
states face a tension between their circumstantial and normative
interests, this would imply that states should give relevance to
statements of belief (i.e., articulations) expressed by the states,
even when articulations lack actual practice.
Before the contingent circumstances of the matter are known,
states articulate rules consistent with their ex ante normative
interests. They have incentives to articulate and endorse rules that
maximize their expected welfare. This rule may not necessarily
correspond to the ex post circumstantial interest of the states in a
specific case and may fail to maximize their actual payoff when
roles and circumstances are unveiled to the states. Thus, timing of
relevant action is important to both participation and effort
incentives. To illustrate the point, it is useful to consider again the
working example of mutual rescue. Given some degree of
uncertainty as to the future course of events, the states’ normative
interests easily align. A rule of mutual rescue clearly maximizes the
expected welfare of the international community at large.
Therefore, if asked in abstract as to whether their society should
bind itself by a norm of mutual rescue, states would likely agree to
bind themselves.
As previously seen in Part III, this type of mutual agreement
may not necessarily occur under traditional processes of customary
law formation. When individuals and states have the opportunity to
manifest their beliefs only through action, their participation and
incentive constraints may undermine their action. At the time of
action, states have biased strategic incentives, which may fail to
induce states’ optimal participation under the circumstances. More
generally, states will usually articulate rules that best fulfill their
current circumstantial interests and welfare rather than the
normative interest and expected welfare derived from an uncertain
future. The aforementioned rescue example illustrates this
principle. In the example, if those in need of rescue require too
much effort, those called to provide the rescue may undersupply it.
Thus, in the absence of previously accepted standards of conduct,
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice has been readily criticized by
D’Amato (1987, 101).
18
Here, it is interesting to point out a strong similarity between the legal and
economic models. Articulations that states make prior to the unveiling of conflicting
contingencies can analogize to rules chosen under a Harsanyian veil of uncertainty.
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states will likely withhold or undersupply mutual assistance. In
such a situation, if adjudicators were asked to choose between the
behavioral standards articulated ex ante and standards advocated ex
post by the states, they would favor the adoption and enforcement
of the ex ante standards of conduct.
B. Custom Formation with Prior Articulation
of the Content of the Norm
The analysis of this section builds upon the predictions of the
previous section and considers the incentive properties of
customary law processes that rely on ex ante articulations. First,
this section explores a setting similar to that considered in Part III;
however, it assumes that states have an opportunity to articulate the
content of what they perceive to be a desirable norm before actively
engaging in the customary practice.19 During the initial period, the
states specify a rule by means of articulation. In terms of the rescue
example, the assumption is that participant states express their
beliefs on the norm of rescue before their respective roles are
unveiled. However, the future horizon for the states is unchanged.
The probability π represents that states will benefit from the
articulated rule, and the probability 1 - π represents the likelihood
that the rule will burden the state. This problem can thus be
compared to the basic customary law problem considered
previously. In this problem, a state’s objective of current
maximization has one less negative term since the endorsement of a
hypothetical rule by means of articulation requires no practice or
effort expenditure.
Articulation processes allow states to pursue their normative
interests while avoiding any potential conflict with their
circumstantial interests. In the traditional customary law case, the
expected payoff from participation had to be greater than the
opportunity cost of participating in the customary practice in order
to satisfy the participation constraint. In the case of articulation,
states also compare participation constraints against the opportunity
costs. Notably, in the case of articulation, the participation
constraint is less likely to be satisfied when it is more costly to
undertake the activity or when the state’s discount rates are higher,
as shown in A2.1.1 of the Appendix. However, states are more
19
Appendix A2.1 shows formulation of the optimization problem faced by a
representative state.
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likely to participate when the benefits from reciprocal cooperation
or the probability of their benefiting from the custom in the future
are higher.
It is also important to determine the effort level that states will
choose when participating in a custom. Careful analysis of states’
incentives reveals an important difference between traditional
custom-formation and articulation processes. Under articulation
theory, the states’ discount rates have no impact on optimal effort
levels.20 However, as previously noted, even under articulation
theory the discount rate has an impact on the participation
constraint. The higher the discount rate, the less likely it is that the
participation constraint will be satisfied, and, consequently, the less
likely it is that the state will join the custom-generating articulation.
Notably, even though higher discount rates may undermine
participation, if the states choose to participate they will choose
optimal effort levels and advocate optimal rules.
The optimal outcomes resulting from articulation are a
substantial improvement over the outcomes of traditional
customary law processes. This improvement occurs because
articulation processes, unlike traditional custom-formation
processes, eliminate the incentives for states to understate their true
normative interests by letting other states commit to a customary
rule before their specific circumstantial interests are unveiled.
A mathematical comparison of the privately and socially
optimal effort level under an articulation model demonstrates that
two effort levels can be identical only if the probability of being a
beneficiary of the emerging rule is one half.21 This means that
homogeneous states and unbiased role-reversibility are important
prerequisites of custom-formation processes, even under
articulation theories. Consequently, when probabilities distribute
equitably, the privately optimal effort level equals the socially
optimal effort level. This principle is also evident in the rescue
example, which shows that when the probability of being rescued
equals the probability of becoming a rescuer in the future, the states
face incentives to articulate efficient rescue rules because the states
will give equal weights to the expected costs and benefits of future
rescue missions. However, this principle does not hold true when
the states face asymmetric probabilities of being rescuers or
victims. In cases of asymmetry, the private and social incentives
20
21
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will diverge and the diverging interests of the states will affect their
resulting articulations.
In practice, lack of alignment between private and social
incentives results because private individuals determine their
optimal effort level by balancing the expected private marginal cost
and benefits. Such optimal balancing takes into account the
individual probabilities of receiving benefits and costs. On the
other hand, in deriving a social optimum, states should not discount
their marginal cost and benefits because of future probabilities.
Instead, states should simply balance social marginal cost and
marginal benefit without weighing social optimums since the ex
post distribution of costs and burdens between the states is
irrelevant. Consequently, the private optimum and the social
optimum will only coincide when the probabilities are uniform for
all players.
C. Articulation and the New Boundaries of Customary Law
This section considers different attributes of custom-formation
processes and evaluates the ability of articulation processes to
overcome the shortcomings of traditional customary processes
identified in Part III. This section also extends the analysis
regarding the relative effectiveness of the different formative
processes in facilitating custom-formation by first comparing the
effect of articulation processes on the participation constraint and
then considering the impact on the states’ incentives.22 Thus, the
modeling and comparison of the participation constraint under
articulation theories and the participation constraint under
traditional customary law results in a model that implies that the
participation constraint is more easily satisfied in the articulation
case than in the traditional customary law case. Therefore, it
follows that allowing potential participants to announce their
participation in the emerging custom and to articulate the effort
level they consider appropriate, ex ante, facilitates the customary
law formation.
Similarly, states can engage in inquiries with respect to the
content of the emerging custom, as symbolized by their chosen
effort level. Under articulation theories, states do so by comparing
the privately optimal effort that other states would advocate with

22

See section A2.2 in the Appendix.
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the privately optimal effort level that they would choose under
customary law. The optimal effort that states would rationally
choose under articulation is greater than the effort that those same
states would choose under traditional customary law processes.
States should also consider the workings of articulation
processes in situations where a customary practice randomly draws
the participants from a larger population. Additionally, states must
assume that not every individual is actively or passively involved in
the custom-generating practice.23 Instead, at each period, a positive
number of non-participants observe others’ activities; the
probability of being an active participant depends on the number of
states involved as shown in the rescue illustration. The model
assumes that the probability of a state being a participant in a
rescue venture depends on the number of states available. It then
compares the articulation results with those obtained in the case of
traditional customary law, and an important difference becomes
apparent. Under articulation, an increase in the number of
participant states reduces the probability of a state’s involvement in
the articulation process of the rescue rule. However, as pointed out
in A2.3 in the Appendix, even though an increase in the number of
states may render participation less likely, once participation
occurs, the states will undertake optimal effort levels and advocate
optimal rules. This is a substantial improvement over traditional
customary law processes that, as seen above, produce less than
optimal effort levels due to pervasive strategic problems in
multilateral settings.
Part III considered the conditions under which optimal practices
would emerge, given uncertainty as to whether a binding rule of
custom would evolve from the states’ initial efforts. Here, that
analysis extends to consider the effects of uncertainty in the case of
articulation processes. As in the customary law case, the analysis
assumes that other participants will follow the practice in question
with a probability β in the future. As shown in A2.3.1 in the
Appendix, an increase in the probability of customary formation
increases a state’s willingness to expend effort, and it has a positive
impact on a state’s willingness to advocate customary norms by
means of articulation. The probability of custom formation thus
affects both participation and incentives under articulation.

23
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Part III also observed that time lags and delays in custom
recognition affect the time in which the initial participants are able
to capture the custom’s benefit when roles reverse. That analysis
found that lags and delays could undermine both the participation
and the effort incentives in a traditional customary law case, thus
rendering traditional customary law processes ineffective at
regulating events of rare occurrence.
Here, the analysis expands to consider the effects of time lags
under articulation processes of custom-formation.24 If after
articulation has taken place a period of time elapses before the
articulated practice consolidates into a binding custom with
expected reciprocal benefits, then the parties are less likely to
actively engage in the articulated practice. Hence, the presence of
time lags negatively affects the participation choice under both
traditional and articulation theories of custom formation. The
longer the delay before any enforcement of the articulated rule
takes place, the less likely that the state will actively engage in the
articulation process. However, as shown in A2.3.2 in the Appendix,
such a delay likely has no impact on the qualitative standards
advocated by the states and the resulting rules of custom.
Notably, these results may originate from delays in rule
implementation that decrease the discounted present value of the
future payoff, thereby weakening the incentives for states to
participate in the articulated venture. On the other hand, delays in
future events do not alter the balance between expected benefit and
expected cost in the future. Consequently, if states meet their
participation constraints, there is no reason for them to alter their
choices of optimal effort, no matter how long the delay.
Additionally, articulation processes of custom formation improve
upon the traditional processes with respect to states’ incentives and
the resulting qualitative content of the emerging custom.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, both strengths and weaknesses are evident in the
customary law formation processes. Customary law is, in many
respects, an effective source of law that generates rules based on
the revealed choices of participating states. Notably, some settings
are more congenial than others to the evolution of customary rules.
Notwithstanding the historical successes of traditional customary
24

See section A2.3.2 in the Appendix.
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law formation processes, some situations significantly undermine
the effectiveness of traditional customary law. Such situations
include: (a) increases in the number of participants, (b) uncertainty
in the future development of the custom, and (c) delays in the
formation and recognition of the custom. Each of these situations
creates a negative effect on the states’ participation and incentives.
These negative effects prompt an analysis of an alternative
mechanism of custom formation, namely, articulation doctrine,
which provides significant benefits over traditional theory.
According to articulation doctrine, customs emerge when states
formulate like-minded articulations before or in conjunction with
customary practice. Most notable among the benefits of articulation
theory is the greater ease with which customary rules emerge as a
result of prior articulation. Likewise, articulation processes of
custom formation always improve the effort incentives for
participating states as compared to traditional processes. This
improvement occurs notwithstanding the possibility of sub-optimal
customs emerging in cases involving asymmetric probabilities.
Another significant advantage of articulated norms over
traditional customary law is that articulated norms allow states to
form consensus on a given norm without having to wait until a
sufficiently large number of states recognize actions as uniform
practice. This decreases the time of formation for customary
norms—a potentially sizeable benefit, especially when the
frequency of participant states’ actions is intrinsically low. In fact,
articulated norms provide some of the same benefits that treaty
laws provide, including the formulation of rules before any instance
of practical implementation. Consequently, articulation eliminates
the first-mover problem that affects typical custom formation.
As illustrated above, however, articulated norms do not always
guarantee the best results. Both articulated norms and traditional
customary law avoid the costly and difficult process of treaty
negotiation and ratification; they both could also diverge from the
ideal, even when the ideal is otherwise feasible. In contrast, in
cases of treaty-created law, full-fledged bargaining between states
can take place, and this may lead to ideal outcomes even when
asymmetric state preferences are involved. In addition, as with
traditional custom formation, delays and time lags can negatively
affect states’ participation choices under articulation theories.
Significantly, the longer the delay before enforcement of the
articulated rule, the less likely that the state will actively engage in
the articulation process. Nevertheless, notwithstanding their effect
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on states’ participation, delays and lags have no negative impact on
the qualitative standards advocated by the states and the resulting
rules of custom.
Another shortcoming of the articulation approach is the risk of
poor coordination among participant states, especially during the
initial stage of norm articulation. For example, if states make
inconsistent initial articulations, this may compromise subsequent
coordination between the states and, as a result, no clear norm will
emerge. Traditional customary law, by looking at actual practice,
avoids such risk because under traditional customary law, first
movers’ initial actions, not untried articulations, become the focal
point for subsequent movers’ actions. Thus, a customary norm only
evolves where the observed practice reveals to participating states
what is expected of them in the future, and consequently,
coordination problems are minimal. When coordination problems
are present, articulation processes may not effectively expedite the
process of custom formation.
Clearly, the respective advantages and limits of the alternative
regimes in different environments have important policy
implications for the design of optimal customary law formation
mechanisms. While this article focuses principally on the relative
effectiveness of traditional and articulation methods for
establishing customary law, further work on this subject should
extend this analysis to persistent and subsequent objector doctrines
and other principles that govern the formation of customary law.
Notwithstanding the possibility of future analytical extensions
regarding customary law formation, this article strongly suggests
that articulated norms are much more likely to produce ideal
outcomes and satisfy states’ participation constraints than
traditional methods.
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APPENDIX
A1. Customary Law Formation
A1.1

Social optimum

In each period, a state can expend an effort level e to generate
some benefit for another state. The social net benefit from e is
SNB = − ae 2 + be , where the marginal cost of effort MC = 2ae is
an increasing function of e , and the marginal benefit of effort
MB = b is assumed constant. In each period, the social optimal
effort level e S is given by e S = b 2a .
A1.2

Custom formation: bilateral case

There are two states. In period 0, one state tackles the need to
exert some effort to rescue the other state. If the state undertakes
the rescue, it would bear cost ae 2 while the other state would
receive benefit be . Subsequently, the same two states are engaged
in repeat interaction. After the initial time period 0, starting from
period 1 to infinity, the states alternate roles. In each period, there
is a probability π that each of the states will be the beneficiary of
other states’ activities, and there is a probability of 1− π that each
state will continue to be on the giving side. If the states follow
socially desirable practices, subject to reciprocity, in each future
period, then π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 calculates the first state’s expected
payoff. If the state has a discount rate r , where r > 0 , then the
total discounted value of expected payoffs from future periods is:

1

1

∑ t =1 (1 + r ) t (π be − (1 − π ) ae2 ) = r ⋅ (π be − (1 − π ) ae2 )
∞

Since the choice of action is in the hands of the rescuer, not the
rescued state, it is sufficient to consider the participation and
incentives of the rescuer state. The following equation shows the
problem facing the individual state with the rescuer responsibility
in period 0 who may become either the rescued or rescuer in some
future period:
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1
max P = − ae 2 + (π be − (1 − π )ae 2 )
e
r
The optimal effort level e C is:

eC =

πb
2a ( r + 1 − π )

Substituting the optimal effort value e C into the objective of the
state gives the following maximal payoff:

P ≡ P (e ) =
C

C

π 2b 2
4ar (r + 1 − π )

A1.2.1. Participation constraint. In order for the state to
willingly participate in the rescue venture, its participation
constraint must be satisfied; that is, P C ≥ k must hold for some k .
It can be readily verified that ∂ P C ∂ a < 0 , ∂ P C ∂ b > 0 ,
∂ P C ∂ r < 0 , and ∂ P C ∂ π > 0 .25
A1.2.2. Incentive problem. From the optimal effort level e C
found in A1.2, the model suggests the following: (i) If π = 0 ,
eC = 0 ; and (ii) If π = 1 , e C = b 2ar . Further, the following
comparative static results obtain: ∂ e C ∂π > 0 , ∂ e C ∂ r < 0 ,
∂ e C ∂ a < 0 , and ∂ e C ∂ b > 0 .
A1.3

Custom formation: multilateral case

Here, the model considers the case in which the probability of
being a participant in a rescue venture depends on the number of
available states N (where N ≥ 2 ). In this case there is a 1 N
probability that the state will be the rescuer, and likewise there is a
probability of 1 N that the state will need assistance from other
states. This means that there is a residual probability of 1 − 2 N
that the state is just a bystander in each future period. The problem
of the state then becomes:

25

For more details, see Fon and Parisi (2002).
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1 1
⋅ (π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
r N

Note that N plays a similar role to r in the state’s optimization
problem. Hence, similar to the comparative static results
∂ e C ∂ r < 0 and ∂ P C ∂ r < 0 found previously, ∂ e C ∂ N < 0
and ∂ P C ∂ N < 0 now hold.
A1.3.1. Introducing uncertainty. The basic model can expand
to include the possibility of uncertainty that is present in custom
formation. Specifically, the problem assumes a probability β
(where 0 < β < 1 ) that others will follow the practice undertaken by
the state in question in the future. in this case, the private
optimization problem is adjusted as follows:

max P = − ae 2 + ( βπ be − (1 − π ) ae 2 ) / r .
e

Thus, since the probability β plays a role similar to that of b in the
optimization problem, the comparative static results are also
similar: ∂ e C ∂ β > 0 and ∂ P C ∂ β > 0 hold.
A1.3.2. Introducing time lags in the formation and recognition
of custom. Here, T represents the number of periods after the
initial action but before the practice consolidates into a binding
custom with expected reciprocal benefits. From period T onward,
the states will act under a reciprocally binding rule of custom, such
that one state may obtain the benefit of the rule or face the burdens
of such rule, with probabilities π and (1 - π), respectively. In this
case, the discounted present value of the future expected payoff is:

∑

1
(π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
2
(
π
be
−
(
1
−
π
)
ae
)
=
t = 0 (1 + r ) t + T
r (1 + r ) T −1
∞

Thus, the problem confronting either state becomes:

(π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
max − ae +
e
r (1 + r ) T −1
2
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Comparing the current problem with the basic bilateral problem
formulated A.1.2, r is replaced by r (1 + r ) T −1 .
As demonstrated in the basic model,

∂ eC
∂ (r (1 + r ) T −1 )

< 0.

Since ∂ r (1 + r ) T −1 ∂ T > 0 , then ∂ e C ∂ T < 0 . Similarly,
∂ P C ∂ T < 0 holds.
A2. Customary Formation with Articulation
A2.1

Custom formation with articulation: bilateral case

This problem considers the customary law processes that rely
on ex ante articulations. In period 0, the states choose a rule by
means of articulation. In future periods, the states will benefit from
the rule with probability π and will be burdened with probability
1− π . Assuming a discount rate, r , the state maximizes the
discounted present value of the total expected payoff:

~ 1
max P = (π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
e
r
The optimal level of effort e A is:

eA =

πb
2a (1 − π )

And the maximal payoff is:

~
P ≡ P (e A ) =
A

π 2 b2
4ar (1 − π )

A2.1.1. Participation constraint. Similar to the traditional
customary law case, the participation constraint P A ≥ k must hold
in the articulation case. Comparative static results with respect to
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the best payoff P A are also similar: ∂P A ∂ a < 0 , ∂P A ∂b > 0 ,
∂P A ∂ r < 0 , and ∂P A ∂π > 0 .26
A2.1.2. Incentive problem. From the optimal effort level under
articulation e A : ∂ e A ∂ a < 0 , ∂ e A ∂b > 0 , ∂ e A ∂ r = 0 ,
∂ e A ∂π > 0 .
A2.1.3. Private versus socially optimal articulation. Comparing
the privately optimal effort and the socially optimal effort level:
Privately optimal effort: e A =

πb
2a (1 − π )

Socially optimal effort: e S = b 2a
This comparison shows that the two are equal only if the
probability of being a beneficiary of the emerging rule is π = 21 .
Also, note that as π → 1 , e A → ∞ .
A2.2 Comparison of custom formation with and without
articulation
This problem compares the participation constraint under
articulation theories and the participation constraint under
customary law theory:

π 2 b2
Articulation theories: P =
≥k
4ar (1 − π )
A

π 2 b2
Customary law theory: P =
≥k
4ar (r + 1 − π )
C

The denominator of P A is smaller than the denominator of P C
since the former has one less term than the latter. Hence P A is
larger than P C . This means that the participation constraint is more
easily satisfied in the articulation case than in the traditional
customary law case.

26
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This problem then compares the privately optimal effort that
states would advocate under articulation theories with the privately
optimal level of effort chosen under customary law theory:
Articulation theories: e A =

πb
2a (1 − π )

Customary law theory: e C =

πb
2a ( r + 1 − π )

The denominator of e A is smaller than the denominator of e C
since r > 0 . Hence e A > e C holds.
A2.3

Custom formation with articulation: multilateral case

The basic articulation model extends to the case in which
randomly drawn states, from a larger population with N states,
participate in customary practice. At each period, the probability of
being an active participant depends on the number of states
involved, 1 N . This is the probability that a state either will
benefit from the customary rule or it will become burdened by the
rule. The following equation represents a state’s private problem:

~ 1 1
max P = ⋅ (π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
e
r N
Since N plays a similar role to r in the state’s optimization
problem, the comparative static results are qualitatively similar to
∂ e A ∂ r and ∂P A ∂ r from before. In other words, ∂ e A ∂ N = 0
and ∂P A ∂ N < 0 .
A2.3.1. Uncertainty and articulation in custom formation. This
problem considers the case in which there is uncertainty whether a
binding rule of custom will evolve from the participant states’
initial efforts. In particular, it assumes that other states will follow
the practice with a probability β ( 0 < β < 1 ) in the future. The
state’s problem thus becomes:

~ 1
max P = ( βπ be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
e
r
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Since the probability β plays a role similar to that of b in the
private optimization problem, in that it amounts to a multiplier of
the future benefits, the comparative static result for β is also
qualitatively similar to the comparative static result for b :
∂ e A ∂ β > 0 and ∂P A ∂ β > 0 .
A2.3.2. Time lags and custom formation through articulation.
Here, T represents the number of periods after the prior
articulation consolidates into a binding custom and reciprocal
benefits are expected. In this case, the private optimization problem
becomes:

max
e

(π be − (1 − π ) ae 2 )
r (1 + r ) T −1

In comparing this problem with the basic articulation case without
time lags formulated in A2.1, it is clear that r (1 + r ) T −1 can replace
r . By adopting results from the basic model, the following hold:

∂ eA
∂ PA
and
=
0
<0
∂ (r (1 + r ) T −1 )
∂ (r (1 + r ) T −1 )
Thus, ∂ r (1 + r ) T −1 ∂ T > 0 when the chain rule, ∂ e A ∂T = 0 and
∂P A ∂T < 0 , is used. Notably there is a difference between the
comparative static result ∂ e A ∂T = 0 and that obtained for the
case of traditional customary processes where ∂ e C ∂T < 0 .
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